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JERRY GREEN AND JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT*
/. INTRODUCTION
Public decision processes involving large numbers of agents face a serious
difficulty whenever there are costs involved in the precise reporting of individuals'
preferences. This obstacle to efficient decision-maldng exists independently of
u'hether there is any incentive problem regarding the agents' desires to report their
true preferences. It may arise either because voring, or preference revelation more
generally, is a costly act, or because the individual does not know his own true
tastes precisely but can learn them more accurately through costly introspection or
information acquisition.
Recently, progress has been made on the incentive quesrion first set forth by
K. Wicksell (1896) and further expounded by R. Musgrave (1959) and P.
Samuelson (1954), among others.^ The goal of this article is to study whether the
solution to this problem proposed by E.H. Clarke (1971) and T. Groves (1973)^
*Harvard University, Cambridge, U.S.A. and Laboratorie d'Econometrie de l'Ecole Poly-
technique, C.N.R.S., Paris, France respectively. A preliminary version of this paper was presented
to the 11 '" NSF-NBER Conference on Bayesian Econometrics, Rochester, 1975.
Early positive results were attained by H. Bowen [1943], E.A. Thompson [19671, and
M, Kurz [1974]. But see P. Bohm [1972] for some other evidence on the severity of the
problem in practice,
2
See J. Green and J.J. Laffont [1976] for detailed comments on the historical
background.
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can be modifiecl through the use of sampling techniques to overcome the weakness
of the individuals' incentives to respond accurately in large numbers situations. We
give a qualified affirmative ansvifer to this question. For a particular set of stochastic
specifications it can be shown that by using the optimal sample size an expected
social outcome superior to that attainable by sampling the entire population can be
achieved. However the solution is still strictly worse than perfect and costless
individual information would allow.
We consider a single public project, fixed in size. The preferences of each
economic agent depend on the acceptance or rejection of this project and on the
level of monetary transfers he receives, if any. Follovidng Clarke and Groves, we will
assume these take the additively separable form:
IT-
Uj = Vj + t- if the project is accepted '_
= t; if the project is rejected
where t- is the monetary transfer. Since the cost of the project is imputed to the
individuals, the willingness to pay, v-, may be negative. Even though the project is
desirable in itself, individuals may not be willing to bear their assigned shares of the
costs.
Let w- be the announced willingness to pay for agent i. The notation
will be employed as a convenient shorthand.
Clarke (1971) has given a social-decision mechanism that is particularly
attractive since it causes each individual to announce his true v-, independently of
his beliefs concerning the willingness to pay others. The project is accepted
whenever 2 wj ^ 0, and individual i pays a tax equal to - ^ w- , if his answer
changes the sign of the sum, that is.
I f 2 w- i 0 and S w. < 0
or If Z w. < 0 and i: w. >^  0 .
Therefore, agent i's gain in utility over the status quo situation is:
V if J: w. 2 0 and J: w. ^ 0
V. + Z w. i f I w. > 0 and I w. < 0
- I w. i f I w. < 0 and E w. > 0
JT i^ ^ i ^ j ^ i ^
0 I f . Z w. < 0 and E w < 0
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It is easy to see that for ^ e n t i (i=l, . . . ,N), any choice w- other than the
truth vj can only lead to a smaller payoff without having any potential for gain.
One weakness of all public decision making processes remains a problem in
this mechanism as well. When the number of individuals increases, each has a
diminishing incentive to participate in the preference elicitation process. Moreover,
if Iiis own tastes are unknown to him and can be discovered only at a cost in real
resources, he may not find it in his best interest to do so. Given that he participates,
his response will not in general be a valid representation of his tastes."'
To circumvent this difficulty we introduce a sampling version of the Clarke
mechanism in which we ask only a sample of the population in order to keep the
strength of the incentive high enough. But a sample implies a sampling error which
can lead to wrong decisions.
In Section II, we explain why the strength of the incentive decreases with the
size of the sample. The individual tradeoff between the information cost associated
v«th an individual's search for his true evaluation and the risk associated with a false
answer is formalized in Section III. Assuming that the decision-maker is a Bayesian
agent and that the population consists of rational expected utility maximizing
individuals, we obtain in Section IV the optimal sample size for certain stochastic
specifications. Section V shows that the informational value of the procedure is
positive. Concluding remarks are gathered in Section VI.
II. STRENGTH OE INCENTIVE
We consider an agent who is in a sample of size n + 1 and who is asked,
through a Clarke mechanism, to reveal his evaluation of a given public project, the
cost of which is assumed to be zero for simplicity of notation. Let x denote the
sum of the answers of the n other agents. From the definition in Section I we see
that agent i's gain, B(Vj, Wj), of saying the truth vj instead of w- is:
0 if V -t- X > 0 and w + x > 0
1 ~ 1 —
or if V. + X < 0 and w -H x < 0:
1 1 *
v^ + X if v_j^  + X >^  0 and w -»- x < 0;
-V - X if V. -I- X < 0 and w. -t- x > 0.
J- 1 1 —
The value of 0 occurs when V| and Wj lead to the same social decision. The value of
Vj+x occurs if agent i's statement of Wj defeats the project when the truth, v., would
not have done so. The value of -vj-x arises if agent i's statement of w- leads to
acceptance of the project when the truth, v., would have killed it.
Groves [ 19731 has shown chat Chen- is a whnlc family of mocliariisms (ot wiiicli the
truth IS a dominant strat.-gy. Tiu-y diff.-r from tlu- Clark.' tucdianism by arbitrary functions of
t ic others arisw.TS. In Green and Laffont |1975 i | we have proved that this family
characterizes the mechanisms which are successful and for which the trutli is a domiiianC
strategy.
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Let G^ (x) be agent i's subjective distribution function over the sum of the
answers of the n other agents. If agent i is risk neutral, his expected gain of saying v-
instead of w- is, for v- ^ 0:
/ (v^is  + X) d G^  (x) i f v^ >
- V . ^ X < - W .
1 ^ 1
or - I /v -1- v^  H n^ (x) i f V. < w
1 i
observe that
i f V. > w
X < - v J
i f V. < w
1
An analogous expression can be derived for vj < 0. Clearly, as n grows, the
probability that x belongs to a fixed interval [ - wj, -Vj] (or [ - Vj, -Wj]) decreases
for n large enough. For example, if the subjecrive probability distribution of x is
normal with mean zero and variance n, we have:
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< X < - vJ =
n
converges uniformly to zero as n goes to infinity. Consequently, Prj^[-w-^x<rVj ]
converges to zero as n tends to infinity.
Therefore, the strength of incentive, measured as the expected gain of saying
the truth instead of any other fixed answer wj, goes to zero as n goes to infinity.
///. INDIVIDUAL BEHA VIOR
We suppose now that the agent does not know his own evaluation exactly,
but that he can acquire costly information about the project itself and about his
own preferences. This uncertainty is here formalized in the following way: each
agent has a prior belief concerning his own evaluation given by a normal
distribution N(O,r ). His informadon gathering'* process is simplified to the
extreme; if he spends an amount c he discovers his true evaluation v. Otherwise he
gives an answer which minimizes his expected regret, that is, the expected shortfall
in utility attained versus that attained under prefect information. We assume that
the ability to process information differs among the agents and that there exists in
the sample a distribution function F{cf which describes the distribution of
necessary costs to discover the truth.
Let vj be the true evaluation of agent i: if he buys information at the cost C',
he answers vj, since we know from the Clarke mechanism (see Clarke [1971] Green
and Laffont [1975a] ), that the response vj dominates any other response w-.
4In Green and Laffont [1975b], we chose a more complex information gathering
process in which an agent has the opportunity to draw an observation w from a probability
distribution whose mean is the true value and whose variance decreases with the expense
incurred. Then, the agent minimizes his expected regret using his posterior distribution. This
model does not permit closed form solutions and requires simulations which prevent a clear
i;xposition of the main ideas.
We approximate this discrete distribution by a continuous distribution independently
of the sample size.
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Consider now an agent i who does not buy information. Let us recall that x
be the sum of the answers of all other agents
X = I W.
The regret of saying w- when the truth is v- can be expressed as:
[ ^ (x) dx
\f. 4 -X < V.
if the agent is underreporting his benefits where g|,(x) is agent i's subjective
probability density over the sum of the others' answers. An analogous expression
where the limits of integration are -Wj ^ x<-v^ applies if the agent is overreporting.
We assume that agent's beliefs are restricted to the family of normal distributions.
The mean and the variance depend on his expectations about who buys informa-
tion. Suppose that he believes that an agent who does not buy information [their
number is, denoted by n^] gives a non-random answer fX. Let k ^
n-| \i. Then x = k + Z v-, where n2 is the number of other agents in the sample
who buy information. Agent i believes that the others' true evaluations are
independent and identical to his expectations concerning his own evaluation.
Consequently,
Varx = n2r^
_ j . (x-k) 2
i 1 ~ 2
Therefore, g^ (x) = ^HZT ®
Proposition 1: Whatever his expectations about the answers of the agents who do
not buy information, if an agent i does not buy information, he answers the mean
of his prior, 0. Consequently, he is led to believe that the other agents who do not
buy information also answer 0, i.e, k = 0.
Proof: Consider agent i who does not buy information. His optimal response is
determined by the minimization of expected regret given v-, i.e,;
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+00
niin I R (v. ,w ) f (v.)
w I n i l 1
i J
—00
where f (v-) is his prior density function, Le., . \--
Let us first compute R (v-, w-)
^ n ^ 1' 1'
If Vj >w-, then:
" ^ ^ J i J .
(x-k)
1 2
e
^ + k) I
V
1 2
e
dx
J r
(x-k) ^ 2
-w. -k -V . - k
(v^+k) [ p ( - ^ ^ > - p ( ^^ — ) ] +
r /nl r /uz
where p (y) =
/2i j e * du
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The same result obtains for Vj < wj. Therefore, the expected regret is:
r - r ;w.-k ^ i - k - i
We differentiate with respect to w; and obtain, the first-order condition,
dv. = 0
—oo
Therefore, w- = 0
Q.E.D.
Therefore, we know that if he buys information, the agent i answers the truth
Vj and he answers 0 if he does not buy information. The remaining problem is: how
does he decide whether or not to buy information?
He will buy information if the expected regret when answering 0 is larger
than his cost, Cj. We take an equilibrium theoretic point of vie win this matter, and
assume that each individual makes a decision, based on his own cost, in the belief
that all other individuals are performing the same calculation relative to their own
costs. An equilibrium situation will be one in which these beliefs are verified by the
actual decisions made. Let F(.) denote the distribution of these costs, c.
If we let k = 0 in (1), we obtain:
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as may be seen by complex but straight forward manipulations.
Since all agents face the same problem, there must be a cut-off point c after
which it is not worthwhile to buy information. Then,
dF{c) = n F ( c * )
Therefore, c* is a solution of the equation
(2) '^- [ /nF
/i
= c
M
The agent must obtain the cut-off point c* and then compare his own Cj to c*. If Cj
> c*, he does not buy information and answers 0. If Cj < c*, he buys information,
he obtains the truth v-, and he answers by revealing it.
In feet ng is a random variable with a binomial distribution [n, F(c}] so that
1" -
,
Vfe approximate E (V n2 + 1' - v n j ] by
+ 1' -
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Proposition 2: There is a unique equilibrium cut-off point.
Proof: Let 0 (c) = - ^ [ >/ n F (c ) + 1' - / n F
/IF
^ (c) = f(c) n f (c)
ac 2 •2Tr / n F(c)+1" / n F(c)'
To determine the equilibrium cut-off point we have the foOowing diagram
r
7Ti\
< 0
(C)
Therefore, there is a unique cut-off point. Q^E.D.
Moreover, the cut-off point is stable in the following sense. E R (v-, OJ is a
decreasing function of c. To obtain the equilibrium c*, the agent can s"tartVrom c.
compute a number n2 of agents buying information by r
Jo
Then, if ER
(vj,OJ > c, the expected cost of not buying information is larger than c, su^esting
that the cut-off point is larger, etc. . .
Proposition 3: The cut-off point goes to zero as the sample size goes to infinity;
when the uncertainty of the agent increases (r increases) the cut-off point
increases, i.e., a larger proportion of agents is buying information.
Proof: It is easy to check by differentiation of (2) that
dr
Suppose that c* converges toc^O when n goes to infinity; then the left hand side
of (2) goes to zero, a contradiction since the right hand side goes to cT
Q.E.D.
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In order to obtain a closed form relation between the equilibrium cut-off point and
the sample size, we first use the approximation:
/nTTT - /nr ^ — ^ for n. laxge
^ /7i~iT ^
Equation (2) then becomes:
2 /2Tr / nF (c**)
In the next section we consider the special cases of distributions of ability to
process information such that:
F ( c ) = - ^ , m > 0 , K ^ > 0 .
(For example if m = 1, this is the uniform distribution on [0, Kj] . More generally,
2 1
the m^" distribution is concentrated on [O,Bj^] where B^ ^^  = ({m+1) K^)ip+1 .)
Then : c * = F ^ 1
^ 2 / 2 - '
IV. OPTIMAL SAMPLE SIZE
The role of the decision maker is to determine the sample size, on the basis of
his prior information, to maximize the presample expected valuation of the project
minus the induced private informational costs.
We assume that the decision maker approximates the distribution of
evaluations in the population of size N by a normal distribution N (v.O^) with an
unknown mean v on which he has a prior N (0,p'^ } such that o^ + p^ = r^ , to ensure
that the decision maker has the same information as any other agent.
The decision maker knows that the agents who do not buy information
answer zero.
n 2
I^t ^ = i ^ l 1 ' the mean of the answers of the agents who buy informa-
tion''. The posterior mean in the subsample of size n j is £;. The posterior mean for
the entire population is
+ n2 p^
e assume that the event, an agent has a true v. = 0, whose probability ia zero, does not
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Therefore, for a decision maker who is assumed to be risk neutral, the post
sample evaluation of the project is:
^^ + p'^
n2
Let h (^) be the ex ante distribution of ^ ; it is clearly a normal distribution of
mean zero and variance + p .
The decision maker accepts the project if the sum of the answers is positive
. . Therefore the pre-sample evaluation of the project is:
ZI—IZ, "i th n2 = nF (c (n)) ,
" 2
The expected private informational costs are:
/ • c * (n)
I c d F (c) .
. Jo
The net value of the experiment with a sample size n is;
G (n , N) = _ _ _ ^
' F (c)g T /
nF(c«(n)) -"P -^
o
The optimal n is a solution of
3V ,
3 ^ ( n , N ) = 0 i f n > O a n d n < N .
To gain some intuition regarding this solution we use the approximation
developed at the end of section II.
. 9." }}^^^ here the decision would be identical if it were based on the mean of theposterior distribution.
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o
The presample evaluation of the project is then:
,2
G (n , N) = g
(n)'
m
with c * (n) = [ ^ ] 2-Hn ^ 2-Hn ^ 2-Hn
2 / 2 ? ^
Differentiating with respect to n and equating to zero we obtain the optimal
sample s^e. For m = 1 (uniform distribution) this is:
n .
pr '
More generally, we can ascertain the rate of growth of the optimal sample size
for m < 1 by differentiating G (n, N) with respect to n and setting n = N"^ . The
2 + m
value of a for which this derivative is zero asymptotically is a = TT- For
2 t 2 22mt2-m
example if m = 54, n* (N) is proportional, in limit, to N ' and if m = 1/10, n
(N) is proportional, in the limit, to N^lO/219/
The coefficient of proportionality is given by
m f l
1 K . N
2-m' r ' p V2/2Tr/ ^
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V. INFORMATIONAL VALUE
In the previous sections we have deducted that the optimal sample size should
grow at the rate of (sj i(2+m)/(2+2m-m J_ ^y^^^^ ^ ^ ^^^ population size andp p
0 ^ m ^ 1 is the parameter of the structure of private information costs as we
have specified it. In this way the three conflicting problems of inaccurate answers,
sampling variance and private information gathering costs are traded off to best
advantage.
Because the process involves real resource costs, however, it is necessary to
demonstrate that the procedure is of positive value to society. More specifically, as
N is large, we want to ascertain the asymptotic rate of growth of the net value of
the procedure. A genuine informational advantage of this method can be said to
follow if this value is positive and if its limit is positive when divided by N. As we
increase the population size in our conceptual experiment, we are implicitly
increasing the scale of the pubHc project under consideration—therefore the per
capita informational value is a sign of the actual informational value of the
mechanism in the presence of inaccurate, costly, personal information regarding
preferences.
Substituting into G, n = N^^ "^ "^ ) ^ (2-t-2m-m ) ^ ^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^ j ^ ^ ^ bound
on the net gain, since the true optimal sample size is on this order but may differ
from it by lower order terms. This gives:
G (n* N) >
^— N
rn
where
1
,. 2-Hn
The first term is positive and its denominator is decreasing in N, approaching
P\/2Tr . The second, negative term is growing at the rate
2 which is less than one for 0 ^ m ^ 1.2-t-2m-m
Therefore G (ni^ jN) is asymptotically positive and, moreover.
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We can now summarize the working of the model as follows. When the
sample size n increases, the proportion of agents buying information decreases since
c*(n) decreases. However, the absolute number of agents buying information
2m
increases since n F (c*(n)) =^  n "'''". Since in this model the agents who do not
buy information do not introduce noise in the answers (they are easily recognized
since they answer 0 and hence are effectively deleted from the sample), it is clear
that without informational costs the optimal sample size would be N. However
22
private informational costs increase as n ^ ^ , so that there is an optimal size of
2-hn
the order of N2m+2-m _
If the answers of the agents not buying information were not detectable, this
noise could well lead to a decreasing number of agents buying information after a
given sample size, so that the optimal sample size would be essentially bounded (see
Green and Laffont [1975] for such a model). Then in a way we could say that the
Clarke mechanism is not really applicable since only a very small proportion of the
population is really sampled, leading to a large potential sampling error. In the
model presented here this does not happen for the reasons explained above. There
may stiU be a difficulty if there is a correlation between the V: and the c-, i.e.
between the evaluations of the public good and the ability to process information,
since we use only answers given by agents with low c-. The conditional expectation
of V given that c is larger than a cut off point c* may be different from the
unconditional expectation in which we are interested. It is not easy to correct the
induced bias. If we want to draw a subsample to estimate the correlation (by paying
everybody his information costs) and then use the estimation to suppress the bias in
the large sample, we face the difficulty that in the subsample, truth revelation will
not be in general a dominant strategy anymore. The costly solution of paying
everybody in the random sample faces another type of difficulty. Information costs
can be divided into information-gathering costs and information-processing costs. It
is clear that the decision maker can pay the information-gathering costs, or, even
better, use the likely increasing returns to scale of information dissemination. No
increasing returns to scale seem to exist in the activity of information processing,
and more importantly there is not way to be sure that, even when they are paid,
agents will incur the (often psychological) costs of information processing.
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